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SUPRE~

IN THE

COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent
v.

DAVID HARMON

Case No. 16421

MEINHP~T.

Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The aooellant, DAVID HARMON MEINHART, appeals from a
conviction of Aggravated Assault, a Felony in the Third
Jef::-ee. in t:!le Third J•.1dicial Dis trice, in and for Salt Lake
County. State of Utah, the Honorable David B. Dee, Judge,
nesiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOweR

COL~T

i:1e appellant, DAVID HARMON MEINHART, was charged with
.-'gg:-avated .-\ssau;.c pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-5-103 (1953
as

a~ended)

On the 16th day of February, 1979, the appellant

·,.,.as fo•.1nd guilty of the offense as charged by a jury.
Subsequent 1::. the appellant was sentenced to incarceration in

::-:e ·.:ta!l State P:-ison for an indeterment term not to exceed
:'ive :;ea::s.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The apoellant seeks reversal of the lower court and
Sponsored
by the S.J.
Quinney
Law Library. Funding
by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The information issued by the office of the Salt
Lake County Attorney alleged:
That on or about the 30th dav of
May, 1978, in Salt Lake Coun-ty,
State of Utah, the said David Harmon
Meinhart did assault Angela Janda
by an attempt, with unlawful force of
violence to do bodily injury to Angela
Janda (age 2), and did recklessly
use such means or force likely
to produce death or serious bodily
injury to Angela Janda.
On May 30th,

the Appellant was placed in a relationship

of in loco parentis as a
Angela's mother was away.

babysitter to Angela Janda while
During this period, at approximate:

7:00 p.!Tl., Angela suffered a head injury res'.1lting in
brain damage.
Sworn testimony established that •..Jithin

c-~-o

davs

following the incident investigating officers had a least
and perhaps several, interviews w' th the Appellant

(T.

c~e

125)

Following these, Appellant was summoned to the main Sheri:f's
office for further questioning by the same
officers, Detectives Bailess and Pechina (T

invest~gating

114)

Prior

to this the Appellant's father had requested of these office:'
that his son not be questioned without the presence of an ate::as Appellant was somewhat slow witted for his age and was
easily influenced by others (T. 125).

This intervie·.., took

place on June l, 1978, in an interrogation room at the Salt
Lake County Metropolitan Hall of Justice

As ide frorr: the

Appellant,
only
Detective
Bailess
and
Detecti•;e
Pec~~na
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding for digitization
provided by
the Institute
of Museum and Library
Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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·.,·ere

present; the interrogation being recorded on tape.

The

questioning was conducted from 10:10 in the morning until

12 20 that afternoon.

The Appellant was not informed of his

constitutional rights, his right to remain silent. or his
right to advice of counsel, in any form at the outset of
the interrogation.

Approximately half way through the

questioning Detective Bailess gave the Appellant the full
":!iranda warning".

When asked if he desired to consult an

attorney the Appellant in turn asked "what would be better?"
Detective Bailess responded 'You know if you'd talk to an
attorney he'd tell you not to say anything

.you're going

to feel a hell of alot better once it's out in the open"
(Interrogation Transcript, page 21).
~nterview

'.-Jas

Later on in the

Detective Bailess, unsatisfied with the answers he

getting, stated,

"~low

the sooner we can get it out. we can

·.-;rap the thing up and talk to the County Attorney, and we can
start

~orking

~ut ".-Je

on this help we talked about on the psychiatric,

're not getting anywhere this way" (Interrogation

Transcript. page 33).

And still later, Detective Bailess,

continuing the theme of the theraputic

help, said " . . .

get if off your conscience and then (sic) so we can start
on the other program and that's getting you lined up in some
c:,pe of ps::chiatric counseling, that you
need"

I

yourself admit you

In te rro rga t ion Transcript, page 36) .

During the entire

interview the only direct reference to the possibility of the
Appel~ant's

criminal liability were the formalized statement

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and
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say can be used in a court as evidence" and vague
reference to "going to the County Attorney" which was in
every instance couched in terms of arrangement for psychiatric
counseling.
At the time this interview took place the appellant
was 20 years old and had completed his high school education
only as far as the 11th grade and had only minimal
employable skills.

Prior to being charged in this offense

the defendant had had no previous involvement •..Jith la1•
enforcement officers or the criminal justice svstem.
During the trial, appellant's father

testi~ied

that

because of a severe accident some five years previous,
appellant was noticeably less perceptive than the average
boy his age and is easily pursuaded by people.
During the interrogation. after the for.nal ":1 iranda
warning" had been given and after repeated assertions
of disbelief by Detective Bailess, appellant

~inallv

stated

that he had struck the child with his open hand or the heel
of his hand.

The significance of appellant's

"con~ession"

at trial is aptly summarized by statements the orosecutor
made during a pre-trial motion to exclude the interrogation
. if the Court were to grant counsel's motion to supores'
the confession, then of course we won't be able to allege
specific conduct (by the appellant)

'''hat conduct

(appellant engaged in) we couldn't tell Hithout the confess:.(January 15th, 1979, Transcript page 3).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
WAS NOT PROPERLY WARNED AT THE OUTSET
OF THE INTERROGATION OF HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN
SILENT OR HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL.

APPELUti~T

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L.Ed. 2d
694, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 10 A. L. R. 3d 974 (1966), the United
States Supreme Court substantially changed the law with
respect to criminal defendants' statements made to police
~uring

interrogation situations.

The Court directly and

pointedly addressed the potential problem of defendants being
unduly and unfairly influenced by the tactics and atmosphere
often present in police interrogations.

The Court concluded

that •
.without proper safeguards the process
of in custody interrogation of persons suspected
of crime contains inherently compelling
~ressures which work to undermine the individual's
~ill to resist and to compel him to speak where
~e would not otherwise do so freely.
In order
to combat these pressures and to permit a full
opportunity to exercise the privilege against
self-incrimination, the accused must be
adequately and effectively apprised of his rights
and the exercise of those rights must be fully
honored.
384 U.S. at 467.
~e

Court went on to elaborate as to its fears and the

prosecutions

t~ey

c:!emanc:!ed:

At t~e outset, if a person in custody
is to be subjected to interrogation
he ~ust be first informed in clear
and unequivocal terms that he had the
risht to remain silen.--- (And)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
-5-OCR, may contain errors.

such a warning is an absolute
prerequisite in overcoming the inherent
pressures of the interrogation atmosphere.
It is not just the subnormal or woefully
ignorant who succumbe to an interrogator's
implications, whether implied or
expressly stated, that the interrogation
will continue until a confession is
obtained
384 U.S. at 467-468
The basic rule as expressed in

~iranda

is that:

. [T)he prosec~tion may not use
statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpator;, stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant unless
it demonstrates the use of procedural
safeguards effective to secure the
orivilege against self-incrimination.
By custodial interrogation, we mean
questioning intitiated bv law
enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custodv or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of. action in any
significant way.
As for the procedural
safeguards to be emploved, unless other
fully effective means are devised to
inform accused persons of their right
to silence and to assure a continuous
opportunity to exercise it, the following
measures are required.
Prior to any
questioning, the person must be warned
that he had a right to remain silent,
that any statement he does make may be
used as evidence against him, and that he
has a right to the presence of an attorney,
either retained or appointed.
The
defendant may waive effectuation of these
rights, provided the ~aiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
If, however, he indicates in any manner and
at any stage of the process that he wished
to consult with an attorney before speaking
there can be no questioning.
Likewise,
if the individual is alone and indicates
in any manner that he does not wish to be
interrogated, the police rna:: not r;ues cion
hiiTI.
The mere fact that he rna" ha·:e
answered some questions or vol~nteered
some statements on his o•..m does not depr~·:e
him of the right to refrain from answer~n€
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney any
Law Library.
Funding for inquiries
digitization provided by
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with an attorney and thereafter
consents to be. [Emphasis Supplied]
[footnote omitted] 384 U.S. at
444-445
The first issue to be decided in determining a
Miranda question is whether the defendant's statements were
made in the course of a custodial interrogation.

This

was defined very basically as "questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way." [footnote omitted] 384 U.S. at 444.
Some typical features of a custodial interrogation,the Court
noted, were that the suspect was held incommunicado and
the atmosphere of such an interrogation is police dominated.
It is obvious that such an interrogation
environment is created for no purpose
other than to subjugate the individual
to the will of his examiner. This
atmosphere carries its own badge of
intimidation, but it is equally destructive
of human dignity. The current practice
of incommunicado interrogation is at odds
with one of our Nation's most cherished
principles-- that the individual may not
be compelled to incriminate himself.
Unless adequate protective devices are
employed to dispel the compulsion inherent
in custodial surroundings, no statement
obtained from the defendant can truly be
the product of his free choice. [footnote
omitted] 384 U.S. at 457-458.
Susequent cases have clarified the Supreme Court's
definition of custodial interrogation.

In Mathis v. United

States, 391 l!.S. 1, 20 L.Ed. 2d 381, 88 S.Ct. 1503, the
Court found there was custodial interrogation for purposes
of the

"~liranda

Rule" '"'here the defendant was in prison

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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investigators regarding federal income tax fraud.
Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S.

324, 22 L.Ed.

In

2d 311, 89 S.Ct

1095 (1969), the defendant had been questioned and he
made incriminating statements in his room after he had
been placed under arrest.

The court stated that by placing

the defendant under arrest the authorities had deprived the
defendant's freedom of action in a significant way.
However,
there was not

in ewe recenc cases
custod~al

United States, 425 U.S.
(1976),

t~e

~~te==ogation.

341, 48 L.Ed.

court found that
In Beckwith v
2d l, 96 S.Ct. 1612

t'"Je court held that statements made by the petitior:.e:-

during an

-~terview wit~

Internal Revenue Service agen:s

did not amount to a custodial interrogation after the
pet~tioner

had become the focus of a tax investigation

Beckwith is readily distinguished from the above cases and
the present fact situation in that the intervie•..J took p:.ace
in a friendly atmosphere at the defendant' ?rivate residence
and that he was read a standard I.R.S. warning informing
him that he had a right to remain silent andhad the right
an attorney before answering.

Defendant agreed to the

interview after the warning was given.

Defendant's con ten c:.:-

on appeal was that he had not been given the formal
"Miranda warning"_
In the most recent case on the issue, Oregon v.
Mathiason, 429 U.S.

492, 50 L.Ed.

2d 714, 97 S Ct

7ll (19"-

the court held that questioning of a suspect at the
station from which the suspect was free to leave J:.d

po~ice
~ot

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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amount to custodial interrogation.
to meet

~e

Mathiason had agreed

investigator at the police station (the defendant

himself having chose the police station as the most
convenient).

The atmosphere of the interview contained

few if any of the "

.compelling pressures

which work

to undermine the individual's will . . . "that were such a
central concern of the Miranda court.

The interview was a

one-on-one situation, lasting for a total of only 30
minutes.

The defendant confessed within the first five

minutes of the interview and was then given the proper
warning.

It should also be noted that Mathiason was at

that time a parolee under supervision and undoubtedly
had a personal familiarity with the workings of the
criminal justice system.

In addition there was no

indication that he was confused as to his rights or whether
he should exercise them.
',.Ji t!-1 regards

to what: cons ti tu tes custodial interrogation

as int:erpreted by the Utah Supreme Court is has been held
chat: a brief questioning of the defendant by the victim in
the court building prior to his arrest is not custodial
interrogation, State v. Guerrero, 29 Utah 2d 243, 507 P.2d
1029 (1973); nor is police questioning a suspect at his home
in front of family and friends custodial interrogation,
State v. Martinez. 23 Utah 2d 62, 457 P.2d 613 (1969).
In this present case the Appellant had been interviewed
ini tiall:: bv investigating officers.

These same officers

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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appear at their headquarters building for further
questioning.

The interrogation took place at the

Metropolitan Hall of Justice which contains the headquarters of the Salt Lake City Police Department,

the

Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, and the Salt Lake County
Attorney's Office.

The questioning lasted for two hours

and 20 minutes in an isolated room with only the Appellant
and the two police officers present.

The officers knew

at that time the Appellant had been tending the victim
when the injuries allegedly occurred, and the facts indicate
that the officer's interest in him rose at least to the
level of being a suspect in their investigation.

All

that Miranda requires is·
[I]ncommunicado interrogation of
individuals in a police dominated
atmosphere, resulting in selfincriminating statements without full
warnings of constitutional rights.
384 U.S. at 445.
In short,

this situation presents a 20 year old

less than average abilities, being confronted
male policemen

b~

bo~.

of

nw adu::.t

in an isolated room at police headquarters.

confronted with continuous questions and expressions of
disbelief in his answers.

There is no way of knowing for

sure if the Appellant would have been res trained had he tri.e·:
to leave, but it cannot logically be imagined that the
atmosphere of the interview or the attitude of the
interrogators 'n1ould have been any more "custodial" 1:' the
magic
words
"you
arrest"
had
been
Sponsored
by the S.J.
Quinney Law
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by these officers.

Under the letter and spirit of Miranda,

and distinct from the facts in Beckwith, supra, and Mathiason,
supra, this present situation falls unequivocally into the
category of a custodial interrogation.
The next question to be addressed is the
constitutional necessity for a full "Miranda Warning" at
the outset of the interrogation.

The Supreme Court in Miranda

specifically stated:
Our aim is to assure that the
individual's rights to choose
between silence and speach remain
unfettered throuEhout the interrogation
process.
(Emphasis Suppl~ed) 384 U.S.
at :.69.
The :-!iranda Court cited Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478, 12 L.Ed. 2d 977, 84 S Ct. 1758 (1964), to stress the
constitutional importance of informing the examinee of his
right to remain silent at the outset of the interrogation.
State case law has also reflected concern over when
the Naming should be given and the effect of failure to
give timely warning.
(Fla

In Buckham v. State, 356 So. 2d 1327

App. 1978), an officer stoppedand questioned the

defencant after he was observed dropping a package later
found to contain narcotics.

The court held that the answers

to the questions \-'ere inaooissible because the defendant had
not been given the "Miranda Warnings".

Furthermore, if the

sus?ect is not given the necessary warnings his statements
Nill be inadmissible.

In State v. Erho, 463 P.2d 779 (Wash.

1970), the defendant was given inadequate warnings, after
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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he was given proper warings and he made a written confession.
The later statements were found to be the direct and derivati•:;
product of the prior "unwarned" oral admissions and hence
none were admissible.
In People v. Hutton, 547 P.2d 237 (Colo. 1976), in
a situation similar to the one at hand, officers questioned
the defendant concerning a burglary, placed him under arrest
and then for the first time advised him of his "Miranda
Rights".

(The record reflected that the defendant was not

free to leave from the time of his first encounter with the
police).

The defendant was again questioned.

Both parties

agreed with the court that the first statement, prior to the
"Miranda Warnings", was inadmissible.

The Supreme Court of

Colorado upheld the trial court's decision that the staternen:
taken after a proper "Miranda Warning" was given •...ras also
inadmissible as it had been obtained under circumstances
not sufficiently distinguishable to purge it of the
original taint, citing, Hong Sun v. United States, 371 C.S
471,83 S.Ct. 407,9 L.Ed.

2d44l (1963).

The Colorado

Supreme Court held that:
The officers should ----have advised the
defendant of his Miranda rights before
questioning him at all.
He do not sanction
their failure to do so by allowing into
evidence defendant's post-advisement
remarks.
[citation omitted] 546 P.2d at 239
The Colorado Supreme Court emphasized that the second
statement was actually a continuation of the first, made on-

a few minutes earlier.

The Supreme Court of Co lcrado no tee ·

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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People v. Pinedo, 513 P.2d 452 (1973), the second
statement was
. an integral part of the first,
and therefore, the impermissable
inducement for the first statement
carried over to the second statement
" 513 P.2d at 454.
Likewise, the case at hand involves two statements, the
second being but a continuation of the first,but preceded
by a "Miranda Warning".

The second statement should be

suppressed as it was not purged of the original taint of
the failure to give the proper warnings at the outset of the
questioning.

This was one interrogation, not two.

The hour

or so of questioning that proceeded the announcement of the
Appellant's constitutional privileges supplied ample
opportunity to ".

undermine the Appellant's will to

resist and to compell him to speak where he would not otherwise
do so freely" in complete contravention of the Miranda
guide lines.

Ponn II
THE APPELLANT DID :-iOT KNOWINGLY AND
INTELLIGE:-iTLY WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN

SILENT OR HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL.

The Supreme Court in Miranda cited Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 C.S. 458, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 146 A.L.R. 357
(1938) as
rights

establ~shing

the standard forwaiver of constitutional

The Johnson court stated
It has been pointed out that "courts
indulge every reasonable presumption

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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constitutional rights and that
we "do not presume acquiescence in
the loss of fundamental rights."
A waiver is ordinarily an intentional
relinquishment or aba~donment of a
known right or privilege. The
determination of whether there has been
an intelligent waiver of the right to
counsel must depend, in each case,
upon the particular facts and circumstances
surrounding that case, including the
background, experience, and conduct of
the accused. (footnotes and citations
omitted] 304 U.S. at 464.
Miranda v. Arizona, supra, is silent on the questions
of the degree of proof necessary or type of analvsis reGuire:
for the courts to find that a defendant had knowingly and
intelligel"':l:: w·aived his rights.

The leading cases on this

question are United States v. Nielson, 392 F 2d 349 (7th Ci:
1968), United States v. Springer, 460 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir.
and United States v. Frazier, 476 F.2d 391
In Unites States v. Nielson, supra.

CD C. 1973)
the defendanr :-:ac

been arrested for auto theft and he refused to sign a
of rights and asked for an attorney.

~~·

waL~e=

However, ·.,:hen the age:::

continued to question him he answered the questions.
held that when a suspect assumes such obviouslv contraJ.ic:c::
positions

(asserting right to remain silent, then ans·n·erir:€

questions) the agents should have been alerted

The cour:

then went on to hold that instead of accepting such an
equivocal invitiation, before continuing questioning :he
agents should have inquired further to deterDine if :he
was the product of intelligence and

understan.:i~g

cr

,J.

c~
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an inquiry was conducted, the court stated that it was
compelled to conclude that there was no knowing and
intelligent waiver of rights.
United States v. Nielson, supra, was distinguished in
Unite States v. Springer, supra.

In Springer

the defendant

had been arrested, read his "Miranda Rights", and signed
the waiver form.

The court found that the signed waiver,

and the undisputed testimony that the waiver form was read
and that the defendant understood the contents of the waiver
was sufficient to raise a presumption of a valid waiver.
In such a situation the burden of going forward was shifted
to the defendant.

The court found that the reason why the

burden of going forward had not shifted in Nielson, was
because the conduct by the defendant in that case was selfcontradictory evidencing a lack of understanding, and in
Springer, there was no such self-contradictory behavior.
In Cnited States './. Frazier, supra. the defendant was
arrested and upon arrest he stated that he knew his rights
and that at the time he was not under the influence of narcotics
or alcohol.

During the interrogation. however, the defendant

refused to allow the police officers to take notes and also
refused to sign

a written version of his statements.

The

court held that the burden of proving waiver is on the
government.

7:Je governr.1ent's burden includes a showing

that the warnings were ?roperly given and, if the defendant
raises the isstle. that the defendant was capable of understanding
Frazier.
the court
found
the
defendant
t'te
·..:arnings
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never asserted that he misunderstood or misinterpreted
the words of warning.
State courts have considered a variety of factors
in determining if there has been a valid waiver of
constitutional rights.

The defendant's youth at the time

that the statements were made had been held to be a factor
to consider along with the other circumstances of the
interrogation, Tennell v. State, 348 So.2d 937 (Fla. App. l9""
but in other jurisdictions a juvenile cannot waive these
constitutional rights without the aid of an interested adult.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 372 A.2d 797 (Pa. 1977).

Some other

factors which have been considered are the low intelligence
of the defendant, Tennell v. State, supra, State V Welch,
337 So. 2d 1114 (La. 1976), State v. Hahn, 259

~

W 2d

753 (Iowa 1977), State v. Thornton, 22 utah 2d 140. 449 P

2c

987 (1969), the confusion of the defendant at the time the
warnings were given, State v. Hilpipre, 242
1976), Commonwealth v. Dustin, 368

~.E

~.\~.

2d 306

(Io·...::;

2d 1388 (:1ass. 197;)

and the emotional stress which the defendant was undergoing
at the time of the interrogation, State v. LaRoser, 313 A 2c
375 (R.I. 1974).
In a very recent decision the Supreme Court has
reaffirmed its strong reluctance to find a wai·:er of
"Miranda Rights." In Tague v. Louis ian a,

C. S.

,

Cr im:.~,

Law Reporter 4166, (decided January 21, 1980), the arres ring
officer testified that he had read the defendan:: his ":·~ira:1~,
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those rights were, nor could he recall whether the
defendant

unde~~tood

those rights.

The officer could not

recall whether he determined if the defendant was capable
of understanding his rights.

The Supreme Court held that

a defendant's capacity to understand his rights cannot be
presumed from his rote responses to a formal "Miranda"
type warning and reiterated the doctrine that a heavy
burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege
aganist self-incrimination.
According to federal and state case law on waiver
of constitutional rights during interrogation the Appellant
herein was in a very poor condition to be asked to waive
those rights.

He had been in isolated interrogation at police

headquarters for a least an hour; with two men accusing him
of lying and in all likelihood, viewing him as their prime
suspect.

The Appellant was a 20 year old youth who had not

completed high school and who had an apparent history pointing
to emotional,if not intellectual, retardation (a fact made
known to the interrrogators during this interview).

Prior

to this occassion Appellant had had no involvment with the
criminal justice system and had no particular knowledge of his
specific legal rights nor any experience in how or why he should
be concerned about them.

\fuen confronted with the choice

of foregoing legal counsel he expressed confusion and in fact
turned to his interrogator for the answer.

Detective

Bailess
then directly implied he would be better off if he did
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not seek legal advice at that time.

The legal advice

he did get in the formalized "Miranda Warning" hardl:r
offset the multitude of factors, internal as well as
external, operating to compror'ise his constitutionally
guaranteed protections or allow him to validly waive
those protections.

CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in
use a statement taken

fro~

allowin~

the prosecution to

the appellant while he was the

subject of custodial interrogation.

The interrogators

had failed to inform the appellant of his constitutional
right to

re~ain

silent and his right to counsel at the

outset of the questioning.

',.Jhen finally inforr:1ed of

these constitutional protections, it was highly likely
that the coercive atmosphere of the interrogation had
irretrievably forfeited those safeguards for this young
and callow appellant.

The law sets a

ve~r

high standard :c:

demonstrating a waiver of these rights and is :::ost reluctan':
to assume such a waiver particularly from the rate-r:r?e
responses as this appellant gave.

The error of adr:Jitting

this statement at trial demands that this court re•:erse t:-.e
judge's ruling and direct that a new trial be conducted ·..J:':~.:.
admission of the appellant's statement taken at ?olice
headquarters on June 1, 1978.
Respectfully submitted this

da:r of

>'arc~..

1?'30
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